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GETTING WHAT

You PAY FOR: JUDICIAL COMPENSATION

AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Jonathan L. Entin*

I. INTRODUCTION
One vital way of assuring judicial independence is to guarantee that judges
need not fear that their salaries will be reduced if they render unpopular or
controversial decisions. The United States Constitution seeks to do this by
providing that all federal judges "shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."'
As the Supreme Court explained in perhaps the leading case on the Compensation
Clause, "[a] Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is
essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from
2
potential domination by otherbranches of government."
• © 2011 Jona~han L. Entin, Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western
Reserve University. E-mail: jle@case.edu.
This is a revised version of the paper I presented at a conference on Judicial
Independence in Times of Crisis at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of
Utah in October 2010. Thanks to Shimon Shetreet and Christopher Forsyth for inviting me
to participate and to Hiram Chodosh, Wayne McCormack, and everyone else at the S.J.
Quinney College of Law for their efficiency and hospitality. Errors of commission,
omission, and interpretation are mine alone.
1
U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). State judges enjoy similar protections
against reduction in compensation. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6(B) ("The judges of
the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas, and divisions thereof, and
of all courts of record established by law, shall, at stated times, receive for their services
such compensation as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during their
term of office."); UTAH CaNST. art. VIII, .§ 14 ("The legislature shall provide for the
compensation of all justices and judges. The salaries of justices and judges shall not be
diminished during their terms of office."); see also infra notes 30, 44 and accompanying
text.
2
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980). Alexander Hamilton made a
similar point: ''Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of judges than a fixed provision for their support." THE FEDERALIST No. 79,
at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Indeed, federal judges do enjoy
"permanency in office": the language immediately preceding the Compensation Clause
provides that these officials "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
It is not clear that "permanency in office" matters as much as Hamilton suggested. As
Justice Story explained, "Without [the Compensation Clause], the other [constitutional
provision], as to the tenure of office, would have been utterly nugatory, and indeed a mere
mockery." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARJES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1622, at 490 (Da Capo Press 1970) (i833). State judges typically do not enjoy
life tenure but do enjoy protection against salary reduction. See, e.g., OHIO CaNST. art. IV,
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The Compensation Clause does not forbid increases in judicial pay; rather it
prohibits only reductions in judges' salaries. This aspect of the clause tmdoubtedly
reflects the notion that the prospect of a pay cut poses a greater threat to judicial
independence than does a pay raise. 3 While the prospect of a salary increase also
could influence a judge's rulings, 4 the framers debated at length the propriety of
allowing for increasing judicial pay before deciding to omit any reference to that
matter from the Compensation Clause. 5
The apparent simplicity of the language of the federal Compensation Clause
and its state counterparts conceals several troublesome issues. 6 Part II of this
Article will address when a judicial salary .becomes vested and thus no longer
susceptible to reduction. Part III considers whether taxation of judicial salaries can
amount to an unconstitutional diminution in compensation. Part IV focuses on the ·
extent to which withholding cost-of-living increases impermissibly reduces judicial
pay. Even in situations that do· not violate the Compensation Clause, questions
§ 6(A)-(B); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 9, 14. Indeed, most state judges must face the
electorate at some point to obtain or retain their positions. See Methods of Judicial
·Selection, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
methods/selection_of_judges.cfin?state= (last visited Jan. 19, 2011 ). In a previous
symposium paper, I suggested that whether judges are elected or appointed matters less
than how politically salient the judiciary is at any particular moment in history. See
Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political Citlture, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 523 (2002).
Whatever the accuracy of that assessment, resolving the debate over whether judges should
be elected or appointed is beyond the scope of this paper.
3
In Hamilton's words, "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over
his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 2, at 472.
4
Cf Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264-65 (2009) (holding
that a state supreme court justice should have recused himself from a case in which the
chairman, CEO, and president of a company that was about to appeal a $50 million
judgment spent $3 million in support of that justice's election); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 531-32 (1927) (concluding that a judge who has a direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome of a case-in this instance by receiving additional compensation from fees
. assessed against defendants whom the judge finds guilty when no such fees are assessed
against defendants whom the judge finds not guilty-may not conduct judicial
proceedings).
5
See Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen,. Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial
Independence, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 965, 971-75 (2006). State counterparts to the
federal Compensation Clause similarly allow for judicial pay raises. See, e.g., state
constitutions cited supra note 1.
6
The relationship between judicial compensation and judicial independence has
generated controversy outside the United States. See, e.g., Provincial Judges Ass'n of New
Brunswick v. New Brunswick, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286, paras. 8-12 (Can.) (addressing
compensation issues in four Canadian provinces where the government had rejected
proposed increases in judicial pay); In re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court
(P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, paras. 5, 110-185 (Can.) (holding that reductions in judicial
salaries made to reduce budget deficits were impermissible and concluding that the salary
recommendations of independent commissions established to improve processes that
ensure judicial independence need not be binding).
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about how much to pay judges, as well as how often and by what process judicial
salaries should be increased, present potentially significant policy issues. Part V
considers some of those questions, and suggests tl:iat the case for raising judges'
pa~ ~hou1d _not rest exclusively or even primarily on the financial aspects of
.. ro-ta 1 CPMT1i"'P
j,:,,;I
UUJ.\.Il.U.L oj'....,.L '.._..,...._....
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The Supreme Court has established that judicial salaries vest for purposes of
the Compensation Clause when they take effect. Proposed pay raises may be
rescinded before their effective date, but once they have gone into effect any such
raises may not be revoked. This is the lesson of United States v. Will. 7 Remarkably,
·the issue did not reach the Court until 1980, riearly two centuries after the
ratification of the Constitution. 8
At issue in Will were appropriations acts for four consecutive fiscal years that
purported to forbid pay raises for federal judges. 9 On October 1, 1976, the first day
of fiscal year 1977, the president signed a bill that contained a prohibition on
judicial pay increases. 10 On July 11, 1977, the president signed a similar bill that
forbade judicial pay raises for fiscal year 1978, which was to begin on October 1,
1977. 11 On September 30, 1978, the president signed analogous legislation to
repeal a judicial salary hike for fiscal year 1979, which was to begin the next day
(October 1, 1978). 12 Finally, on October 12, 1979, the president signed legislation
that reduced the amount of a judicial pay raise for fiscal year 1980, which had
begun on October 1, 1979. 13
More. than a dozen federal district judges filed class actions challenging all
four of these measures. 14 The Supreme Court concluded that the judicial pay raises
for fiscal years 1977 and 1980 "had taken effect, since [they were] operative with
the start of the month-and the new fiscal year. " 15 This was true for fiscal year

449 u.s. 200 (1980).
Id. at 221 (noting that the case posed a question "never before addressed by this
Court").
9
Id. Those measures also affected members of Congress and the executive branch,
but the Constitution does not forbid pay cuts for those officials.
10
Id. at 205-06.
11
Id. at 206-07.
12
Id. at 207-08.
13
Id. at 208-09.
14
Id. at 209-10 & nn.7-8.
15
Id. at 224-25 (fiscal year 1977); id. at 230 (fiscal year 1980). Before reaching the
merits, the Court concluded that it could decide the case even though every justice had a
financial interest in the outcome. Id: at 210. The challenges to these appropriations riders
were class actions on behalf of all Article III judges who were on the bench during the
relevant time periods. See id. at 209. The justices concluded that, under the Rule of
Necessity, they had an obligation to decide the case. Id. at 217. The correctness and
propriety of this conclusion are beyond the scope of this Article.
7

8
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1977 even though the appropriations bill had become law just a few hours into the
budget period, on October 1. The bill "purported to repeal a salary increase already
in force." 16 And while the fiscal year 1977 and fiscal year 1980 riders also applied
to congressional and executive salaries, the absence of discrimination against
judges was irrelevant: the other officials did not enjoy the protection against salary
reduction that the Compensation Clause affords to the judiciary. 17 By contrast, the
laws applicable to fiscal years 1978 and 1979 passed constitutional muster-in
both instances, the president had signed the measures before October 1, the first
day of the fiscal year. 18
Why the different results? The Court explained that "a salary increase 'vests'
for purposes of the Compensation Clause only when it takes effect as part of the
compensation due and payable to Article III judges." 19 Under the statute that
governed judicial compensation at the time, salaries became effective on October
1, the first day of the fiscal year. 20 Accordingly, the fiscal year 1977 pay raise had
gone into effect and could not be revoked later in the day? 1 In addition, the fiscal
year 1980 increase had been effective for nearly two weeks when Congress tried to
eliminate it. 22 On the other hand, a rescission that takes effect even on the very last
day of the previous fiscal year can prevent a judicial salary increase from taking
effect at the start of the new fiscal year. That is why the fiscal year 1979 rider was
pennissible. 23 The fiscal year 1978 measure was even more clearly pem1issible
because it had been adopted nearly three months in advance of the compensation
hike's effective date_2 4
In shorl, Congress may not lower judges' salaries, but it has broad discretion
to grant or withhold judicial pay raises before the beginning of the fiscal year. This
was especially true because the proposed pay raises resulted from the application
of a formula that applied only prospectively, with the start of the new fiscal year.
To hold that Congress must apply the formula would show disrespect for a
"coequal branch[]" and necessarily imply that "the Judicial Branch could

con
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Id. at 225.
Id. at 226. The president's compensation was not affected by these appropriations
riders. A separate constitutional provision freezes the chief executive's compensation
during his term of office. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 7 (providing that the president's salary
"shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected"). A subsequently ratified constitutional amendment would have prevented any
change in congressional salaries until after the next biennial election. Id. amend. XXVII
(prohibiting the passage of any measure "varying the compensation for the services of the
Senators and Representatives . . . until an election of Representatives shall have
intervened").
18
Will, 449 U.S. at 226, 229.
19
Id. at 229.
20
Id. at 204.
21
Id. at 226.
22
Id. at 230.
23
Id. at 229.
24 Id.
17
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Id. at 228.
905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006).
27
See id. at 925. The measure adopted formulas for determining compensation levels
for officials in all three branches effective immediately. !d.
28
Id. In fact, two Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices had difficult retention
elections later in the year. One justice was defeated, and the other survived "by an
unusually narrow margin." Id at 926.
29 Id.
30
PA. CONST. art. V, § 16(a) (emphasis added).
31
Stilp, 905 A.2d at 939.
.
32
Id. Before addressing the merits, the court, relying in part on Will, concluded that
the Rule of Necessity authorized the justices to decide the case despite their financial stake
in the outcome. I d. at 929.
33
Id. at 939.
34
Id. at 948.
35
Id. at 944.
36
Id at 940.
37
Id. at 944.
26
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command Congress to carry out an announced future intent as to a decision the
Constitution vests exclusively in the Congress." 25
Similar issues have arisen at the state level, where courts also have enforced
judicial salary protections analogous to those in the federal Compensation Clause ..
A recent example comes from Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Stilp, 26 the state
supreme court rebuffed an effort to roll back a pay raise four months after it had
gone into effect. In July 2005, the Pennsylvania General Assembly, literally in the
middle of the night and without debate, passed a bill that raised salaries of
27
legislators, many executive officials, and judges. In a remarkable piece of judicial
understatement, the court described voter reaction as "negative. " 28 Shortly after the
November 2005 election, the legislature repealed the controversial measure.Z 9
The Pennsylvania Constitution contains a clause providing that judges'
compensation "shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law
applying generally to all safaried officers of the Commonwealth." 30 Because of the
italicized exception, no analogue of which appears in the federal Compensation
Clause, the comi discerned two issues: (1) whether the repeal diminished judicial
compensation, and (2) whether the exception applied. 31 The first issue, the court
observed, "need not detain us long." 32 The challenged measure quite clearly
"reduced [judicial] salaries during the judges' terms of office" to the levels that
existed before middle-of-the-night passage of the July pay raise. 33
The more complicated issue related to the applicability of the exception for
general pay cuts for all salaried state officers. The exception served as "a failsafe
during a state-wide economic crisis,"34 not as a legitimate reaction to "a political
backlash." 35 Pennsylvania faced no "dire financial circumstances," 36 so the
exception could not justify repeal of the judicial pay raise. Even if the legislators
had acted in "good faith," their motivation did not matter. 37 Ally other conclusion
would leave "no barrier preventing [them] from pursuing other means of attacking

25
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the independence of the Judiciary." 38 Beyond these general concems, the repeal
measure did not fit within the terms of the exception because it did not actually
apply to "all salaried officers of the Commonwealth. " 39 The original bill, which
had generated so much controversy, applied to judges and legislators effective
immediately, but executive salaries would not go up until more than a yeat later. 40
Because the repeal measure reduced only judicial and legislative pay, it did not
qualifY under the constitutional exemption for general rollbacks in compensation. 41
Accordingly,· the judicial salary increases provided in the controversial July law
remained in effect. 42
While Stilp follows the analytical framework laid down in Will, some state
courts have followed a more robust approach that might have invalidated even the
pre-October 1 rescissions that Will found to be compatible with the federal
Compensation Clause. For example, in Jorgensen v. Blagojevich 43 the Supreme
Court of Illinois found that efforts to prevent judicial salary increases from taking
effect before the start of the fiscal year violated the Compensation Clause of the
state constitution. 44 The issue arose when Govemor Blagojevich sought to block
cost-of-living increases for judges that had been authorized by law for fiscal years
2003 and 2004. Before the start of fiscal year 2003, the legislature suspended costof-living increases for all state officials. 45 Later, however, both chambers passed a
bill restoring the raise for judges only, but the govemor vetoed that bill. 46
!d.
!d. at 946.
40
!d. at 947.
41
/d. The court also concluded that the original bill's provlSlons applicable to
legislators violated a constitutional prohibition against mid-term pay raises for members of
the Pennsylvania General Assembly. !d. .at 970. Finally, the court refused to enforce the
nonseverability clause 1n the July pay-raise bill. !d. at 980. This ruling had particular
significance for the fate of the judicial pay provisions because of the court's conclusion that
the section of the pay-raise bill relating to legislators was unconstitutional. If the
nonseverability clause were enforced, the judicial salary increases also would have been
struck down. That would have rendered superfluous the November repeal measure and
meant that judges' compensation should never have increased.
42
See id. at 949.
43
811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2004). It should be noted that this case arose several years
before Governor Blagojevich found himself in such hot legal water that he was impeached
and removed from office by the state legislature and put on trial for political co1ruption.
See John Chase & Stacy St. Clair, A Politician's Rise, Hard Fall, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2009,
at 4; Malcolm Gay & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich Is Removed by Illinois Senate, 59-0,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A19. It should also be noted that the governor's earlier
actions in connection with judicial compensation played no role in his impeachment and
criminal proceedings.
44
Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d at 670; see also ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 ("Judges shall
receive salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished to take effect during their
terms of office.").
45
Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d at 655.
46
!d. at 655-56.
38

39
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Meanwhile, two days after the start of fiscal year 2004, the governor deleted from
that year's appropriation bill the funds that would have covered annual cost-of47
living increases for judges.
The Supreme Colli"'i of Illinois held that the state could not v,rithhold the costof-living increases for either year. 48 It did not matter whether the measures setting
aside the pay raises had been enacted before or after the start of the fiscal year .
Under Illinois law, those increases had vested years earlier. 49 In 1990, the
legislature approved a report by the Compensation Review Board, which set
salaries for various state officials (including judges). 50 That report contained
standards for adjusting salaries and made clear that cost-of-living increases "were
to be considered a component of salary fully vested at the time the . . . report
became law. " 51 Under the circumstances, state judges were entitled to their cost-of. living increases whether the governor's efforts to block those increases took place
before or after the first day of the applicable fiscal year. 52
These cases establish a baseline principle: constitutional prohibitions against
diminishing judicial compensation mean that the other branches may not reduce
the salaries paid to judges once those salaries have vested. There might be
disagreement about when those salaries vest but, at a minimum, it is clear that after
the beginning of the fiscal year salaries may not be reduced. 53 More difficult
questions have arisen with respect to whether judicial salaries may be taxed and
whether compensation is unconstitutionally reduced when the other branches
withhold cost-of-living increases for a prolonged period of time during which
inflation erodes the purchasing power of the nominal salary. The ne~t two parts
address these questions.

III. TAXING JUDICIAL SALARIES
The Supreme Court struggled for more than eighty years with the question of
whether imposing taxes on the salaries of federal judges violated the
I d. The legislature enacted the appropriations bill before the start of the fi~cal year,
but the governor did not use what is known as a "reduction veto" until after the fiscal year
had begun. Id. at 656.
48
Id. at 665. Before addressing the merits, this court followed Will and concluded that
it could decide the case under the Rule of Necessity even though all of its members were
part of the plaintiff classes for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. I d. at 660.
49
Will did not control resolution of the issue of vesting. According to the Illinois
court, the vesting issue was controlled by state law. Id. at 664.
50
Id. at 655. The board's salary determinations go into effect unless both houses of
the legislature reject or alter them within a specified statutory period. Id. at 654.
51
Id. at 664.
52
See id. at 665.
53
Courts have permitted a reduction in the amount of a judge's pay when there has
been a mistake in determining the judge's salary. See, e.g., Maddox v. Hayes, 598 S.E.2d
505, 506-07 (Ga. 2004). Cases like this present the only exception I have found to the
general statement in the text.
47
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Compensation Clause. 54 The problem arose in the wake of the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment, which authorized the federal government to levy taxes "on
incomes, from whatever source derived," and without regard to the appmiionment
requirement for direct taxes. 5 5 ·
- In Evans v. Gore, 56 a 1920 case, the Court held that Congress could not
constitutionally extend the federal income tax to Article III judges. The case was
brought by a federal district judge who had been oh the bench for tWo decades
when the tax was imposed. 57 By requiring the judge to remit the tax after receiving
his pay, the government was, for all practical purposes, reducing his salary: "Was
he not placed in practically the same situation as if [the money] had been withheid
in the first instance? Only by subordinating substance to mere form could it be held
that his compensation was not diminished." 58 The whole point of the
Compensation Clause was that "the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to
the compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for his support during his
continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this
regard may be changed to his disadvantage. " 59
60
Five years later, in Miles v. Graham, the Court ruled that the income tax
could not constitutionally be applied to a judge who was appointed after the
enactment of the tax. Justice McReynolds explained that the timing of the judge's
appoinhnent made no difference to the Compensation Clause analysis: Congress
must fix judicial salaries, after which "the amount specified becomes the
compensation which is protected against diminution during [the judges']
continuance in office." 61 Because the tax diminished the judge's ·pay, it was
invalid. 62
Miles v. Graham did not last long as a precedent. For one thing, the challenge
was brought by a judge of the old Court of Claims. At the time, both the parties
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The issue flared briefly when Chief Justice Taney objected to paying the income
tax that was imposed during the Civil War. The issue was never litigated, but in 1873 the
federal government refunded the taxes that federal judges had paid. See Entin & Jensen,
supra note 5, at 979-81.
55
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. On the apportionment requirement, see Erik M. Jensen,
The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?,
97 COUJlvL L. REv. 2334, 2339-41 (1997). The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to
overrule Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which invalidated a
nineteenth-century income tax because it was an unapportioned direct tax. The income tax
at issue in Pollock was not the tax that was imposed during the Civil War, the validity of
which was never litigated. See supra note 54.
56
253 U.S. 245 (1920), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001).
57
Id. at 246.
58
Id. at 254.
59
Id. at 249.
60
268 U.S. 501 (1925), overruled by O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
61
Id. at 509.
62

Id.
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and the Supreme Court assumed that the Court of Claims was an Article III
tribunal, and therefore its members were covered by the Compensation Clause. 63
Eight years later, however, the Supreme Court held that the Court· of Claims was
an Article I court, so its members were not protected by the Compensation
Clause. 64 Nevertheless, by the time Congress established the Court of Claims as an
Article III body, 65 Miles v. Graham had been overruled.
66
In 1939, O'Malley v. Woodrough upheld the taxation of the salary of a
federal circuit judge who took office after the relevant tax statute was enacted. 67
Seeking to avoid the judicial tax immunity recognized in Evans v. Gore, 68
Congress limited the statute's coverage to Article III judges who were appointed
69
after its effective date. Justice Frankfurter could scarcely conceal his incredulity
at the view that subjecting newly appointed judges to a nondiscriminatory, preexisting income tax might compromise judicial independence. The tax merely
"charge[s] them with the common duties of citizenship, by making "them b,ear their
70
aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government." The contrary position
"trivialize[s] the great historic experience on which the framers based the
safeguards of Article III, § 1."71 The opinion concluded by observing that, if any of
its reasoning was "inconsistent with what was said in Miles v. Graham, [that
decision] cannot survive."72 In short, Miles v. Graham was overruled. Curiously,
all of the criticism that 0 'Malley v. Woodrough had heaped on that case
applied equally to Evans v. Gore, but the Court said nothing about the earlier
case's vitality. 73 It took more than sixty additional years for the Court to repudiate
Evans v. Gore.
.
Its end came in the 2001 case of United States v. Hatter/ 4 which chaiienged
the extension of Medicare and Social Security taxes to sitting federal judges.
Before 1983, Article III judges-as well as most other federal employees-were
exempt from both taxes. 75 Eight federal judges, who were on the bench when the
change took place, claimed that extending Medicare and Social Security taxes to

i to paying the income
tigated, but in 1873 the
d. See Entin & Jensen,
63

:nt, see Erik M. Jensen,
Taxes Constitutional?,
1dment was adopted to
'5), which invalidated a
ect tax. The income tax
vil War, the validity of
32 U.S. 557 (2001).

307 u.s. 277 (1939).

See id. at 502 (government); id. at 503 (Judge Graham); id. at 505 (Supreme Court).
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 569-70 (1933).
65
Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, § 1, 67 Stat. 226, 226 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 171 (2006)).
66
307 U.S. 277 (1939).
67
Woodrough had been a district judge when the tax statute was adopted and was
appointed to the court of appeals after the enactment of the tax law. The Court found this
fact "wholly irrelevant to the matter in issue." Id. at 279-80.
68
Id. at 280.
69
!d. at 281-82.
70
Id. at 282.
11 Id.
72
Id. at 283 (citation omitted).
73
See Entin & Jensen, supra note 5, at 988-89.
64

74

75

532 u.s. 557 (2001).
Id. at 561-62.
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· them violated the Compensation Clause. 76 The Hatter Court concluded that Evans
v. Gore had misapprehended the scope of the prohibition against diminution of
judicial salaries and must be overruled. 77 The Constitution does not forbid "a
nondiscririllnatory tax that treat[s] judges the same way it treat[s] other citizens."78
Tw-ning to the merits, the Court had little difficulty upholding the extension of
Medicare taxes to Article III judges as part of a statute that also brought most other
federal workers, who previously had been exempt, into that program. 79 The Social
Security tax extension was another matter. Although that change brought
previously exempt federal workers undey Social Security, it also effectively
insulated virtually all newly eligible workers-except for federal judges-from
additional payroll taxes. 80 As a result, the Social Security extension discriminated
against federal judges and thereby ran afoul of the Compensation Clause. 81
As a practical rp.atter, Hatter makes it unlikely that taxation issues will
intersect with the Compensation Clause in the future. Hatter allows Congress to
impose nondiscriminatory taxes on federal judges but prohibits the imposition of
taxes that target the judiciary, which seems to be a highly unlikely prospect. The
main qualification to this assessment concerns the purpose of the Compensation
Clause. To the extent that this provision is meant to safeguard judicial
independence, it is difficult to envision a scenario under which Congress would
enact a tax that discriminates against federal judges, no matter how controversial
or unpopular the judges' rulings might be.
Lurking in these cases, however, is another rationale for the Compensation
Clause: to attract excellent lawyers to the bench. This was part of the rationale for
the decision in Evans v. Gore. Justice Van Devanter's majority opinion in that case
quoted Chancellor Kent's observation that the prohibition on diminution of judicial
salaries serves "to secure a succession of learned men on the bench."82 Although
Evans v. Gore has been overruled, the Court continues to endorse this rationale for
the Compensation Clause. Indeed, Hatter endorsed this aspect of the Evans
opinion83 just three paragraphs after announcing that Evans was no longer good

76

at 564.
at 571.
at 569.
at 572.
80
See id. at 562-64, 572-73.
!d.
!d.
78
!d.
79
!d.
77

81

!d. at 576. All seven justices who partiCipated in Hatter agreed that extending
Social Security taxes to sitting Article III judges violated the Compensation Clause. See id.
at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring in pirrt and dissenting in part); id. at 586-87 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
82
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920) (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON .AMERICAN LAW *294), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001).
Justice Van Devanter added that the Compensation Clause'.s "primary purpose" was "to
attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action
and judgment which is essential" to the proper administration of justice. !d.
83
532 U.S. at 568.
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84 In addition to possibly deterring outstanding lawyers from considering
.• w. s on the bench, stagnant judicial salaries have fueled widespread concern and
caree~ated litigation claiming that persistent failure to raise judicial salaries has led
gen ignificant erosion in judges' purchasing power, which is said to represent
. . w1t
. h"m the meanmg
. of the ,_.ompensa.wn
"
t.
1'1
nr
:to sonst1"tutional dimmutwn
~.ause. vv c
.. lillC
·
turn next to that issue.

IV. WITHHOLDING COST-OF-LIVING INCREASES
The Compensation Clause implications of inflation were foreshadowed in yet
another way in Hatter. After concluding that the extension of Social Security taxes
to sitting federal judges constituted an impermissible diminution in judicial pay,
the Court rejected the government's argument that subsequent pay raises, which
exceeded the cost of the new taxes, served to remedy the violation. Citing statistics
showing that judges' pay had risen less than the rise in the Consumer Price Index
and less than private-sector salaries had gone up over a three-decade period, 85
Justice Breyer concluded that "the judicial salary increases [cited by the
government] simply reflected a congressional effort to restore ... to judges ...
some, but not all, of the real compensation that inflation had eroded." 86
Accordingly, those increases could not be used to justifY the extension of Social
Security taxes to judges in violation of the Compensation Clause. 87
As it happens, at the time of the Hatter decision, Williams v. United States, 88 a
case addressing the erosion in the real value of judicial salaries, was making its
way thro1,1gh the system. Williams rejected a Compensation Clause challenge to
congressional action setting aside several cost-of-living increases in judicial
salaries: The case arose under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 89 which est~blished
a new system for determining judges' pay. That statute raised judicial
compensation by 25% to make up for the effects of inflation. 90 In addition,
beginning January 1, 1991, it provided for cost-of-living increases for federal
judges in any year that civil service employees received such salary adjustments. 91

84

!d. at 567.
!d. at 579. Federal district judges' pay increased by 253% between 1969 and 1999;
the Consumer Price Index rose by 363% and private-sector salaries went up by 421%
during the same time period. Id
86 Id
87
Id at 581.
88
240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
89
Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989).
90
!d.§ 703(a)(3), 103 Stat. at 1768 (codrfied at 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note (2006)).
91
Id § 704(a)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 1769 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 461
(2006)). The statute also strictly limited outside income and forbade the acceptance of
honoraria. !d. § 601, 103 Stat. at 1760 (codified at 5 U.S. C. app. § 501 (2006)).
85
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Although judges received cost-of-living adjustments for several years, Congress
passed legislation blocking raises in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999.92
A group of federal district judges filed the Williams suit, claiming that
withholding cost-of-living adjustments unconstitutionally diminished their
comuensation. 93 Reversin2: the district court. the United States Court of Anneals
for the Federal Circuit held that Will controlled the dispute and doomed the judges'
claims: the blocking statutes were enacted before January 1 of each relevant year,
so the cost-of-living increases for those years never took effect. 94
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, over the dissent of three justices. 95 With
the support of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, Justice Breyer (who wrote for the
Court in Hatter), wrote a twelve-page opinion suggesting that Williams raised
important issues that deserved plenary consideration. 96 Part of Justice Breyer's
reasoning drew on Justice Scalia's partial dissent in Hatter, which emphasized that
the exemption from taxation "was part of [the judges'] employment package.'m In
Justice Breyer's view, the Ethics Reform Act "mandates adjustments to judicial
salaries; the adjustments are mechanical and precise; and they are to take place
automatically," subject to very limited statutory exceptions that would deny similar
increases in the compensation of federal civil service employees. 98 This
alTangement differed significantly from the statutory scheme at issue in Will,
which was, in Breyer's view, "neither definite nor precise." 99 Accordingly, the
Ethics Refonn Act could be seen as embodying a congressional commitment "to
protect federal judges against undue diminishment in real pay by providing cost.L
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Williams, 240 F.3d at 1024. In addition, civil service employees did not receive a
raise in 1994, so neither did judges. !d.
93 !d.
94
!d. at 1031 ("[E]ach of these unambiguous laws ... was passed by Congress and
approved by the President before the January 1 date that the [cost-of-living adjustments]
were to take effect. Under Will, put simply, that is the end of our inquiry, and the Judges'
cause must fail."). The district comi had granted summary judgment to the plaintiff judges.
Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 52, 60-61 (D.D.C. 1999). The Federal Circuit
panel was divided: a dissenting judge argued that the court should uphold the legislative
compromise embodied in the Ethics Reform Act. Williams, 240 F.3d at 1040 (Plager, J.,
dissenting).
95
Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911 (2002).
96
!d. at 911.
97
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 585 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see Williams, 535 U.S. at 916-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Justice Scalia had agreed with the Hatter majority that extending Social
Security taxes to sitting federal judges violated the Compensation Clause, but he contended
that the Medicare tax extension was also unconstitutional. Hatter, 532 U.S. at 581 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98
Williams, 535 U.S. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
99
!d. at 917. The scheme in Will, which had been superseded by the Ethics Reform
Act, "was imprecise as to amount and uncertain as to effect" because the process for
determining whether to increase salaries involved several different actors, each of whom
could reject a recommended pay raise. See id.
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of-living adjustments to guarantee that their salaries would not fall too far behind
inflation," 100 and the blocking statutes that withheld those adjustments could be
conshued as breaching that congressional comniihnent in violation of the
. Cl ause. 101
Compensatwn
.
·
r,... ""~rlition fHihm.~ to raise iudicial salaries had caused genuine economic
harm. The real value of federal district judges' pay had declined by nearly 25%
since 1969, leaving judicial compensation "below that of typical mid-level (and a
few first-year) law firm associates and many law school teachers and
administrators, [while] the real compensation earned by the average private sector
worker has increased, as has that in nearly all employment categories outside high
levels of Govemment." 102 To reinforce his point, Breyer attached three charts as an
103
appendix to his opinion.
Meanwhile, in late 2001 Congress made permanent the language of a 1981
appropriations rider requiring specific legislative approval for any judicial pay
increase. 104 This development changed the process for awarding cost-of-living
increases for federal judges from a presumption in favor of such adjustments, the
system embodied in the Ethics Reform Act, to a presumption against them.
Moreover, the change affected only federal judges. Under the reasoning of Hatter,
which focused on whether Congress had "impose[d] a special legislative burden
upon [judges'] salaries alone," 105 singling out the judiciary for less favorable
JJ..I.

....... ~..._.. ......... .._. __ ,
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!d. at 920 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
See id. at 921.
102
Id.
at 920.
103
These charts were bound into volume 535 of the U.S. Reports between pages 922
and 923.
101
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104
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 625, 115 Stat: 748, 803 (2001). The
rider provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or of this joint resolution, none
of the funds appropriated by this joint resolution or by any other Act shall be
obligated or expended to increase, after the date of enactment of this joint
resolution, any salary of any Federal judge or Justice of the Supreme Court,
except as may be specifically authorized by Act of Congress hereafter enacted:
Provided, That nothing in this limitation shall be construed to reduce any salary
which may be in effect at the time of enactment of this joint resolution nor shall
this limitation be construed in any manner to reduce the salary of any Federal
judge or of any Justice of the Supreme Court. This section shall apply to fiscal
year 1981 and each fiscal year thereafter. ·
28 U.S.C. § 461 note (2006). This provision originated as part of a continuing resolution
for fiscal year 1982. H.R.J. Res. 370, Pub. L. No. 97-92, § 140, 95 Stat. 1183, 1200 (1981).
105
Williams, 535 U.S. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 572 (200 1) (emphasizing that the extension of Social
Security taxes to sitting judges "discriminate[d] against [those] judges in a manner
forbidden by the [Compensation] Clause").
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treatment in connection with cost-of-living adjustments might well violate the
Compensation Clause. Perhaps the answer to that question depends on whether, as
Justice Breyer's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Williams suggested, the
judges' constitutional entitlement to cost-of-living increases vested with the
passage of the Ethics Reform Act 106 or, as Will concluded, only on the effective
date of any judicial pay raise authorized by Congress. 107
·
It is possible that we will soon get an authoritative response from the Supreme
Court. After Congress failed to increase judicial salaries for 2007, another group of
judges. (including Judge Hatter) filed a new lawsuit alleging that their
compensation had been diminished unconstitutionally. 108 In Beer v. United
States, 109 the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the dismissal of the complaint,
reasoning that the case was fimctionally identical to and therefore controlled by its
decision in Williams. 110 A petition for certiorari was filed in May 2010, and the
case has been on the Supreme Court's conference list regularly since the beginning
of the current term, but no disposition of the petition has yet been announced. 111
Although federal judges so far have been unsuccessful in challenging the
withholding of cost-of-living adjustments, a month after the Federal Circuit's
rejection of Beer, a group of New York State judges prevailed on a similar
claim. In Maron v. Silver, 112 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the state
judiciary had been wrongly deprived of cost-of-living increases over an elevenyear period during which the real value of judicial salaries had declined between
25% and 33%. 113
The decision did not rest on the state's Compensation Clause, 114 but rather on
general principles of separation of powers. The legislature had not explicitly
reduced judicial salaries nor had it passed any measure that discriminated against
106

Williams, 535 U.S. at 921.
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 229 (1980).
108
Congress did not approve judicial salary adjustments for 2007 and 2010. Beer v.
United States, 592 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for hearing en bane), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. May 14,
2010) (No. 09-1395). Although not at issue in that lawsuit, federal judges also will not
receive a pay raise in 2011. No COLA for Congress, Federal Judges· or Judiciary
Employees, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2010, at 3.
109
361 F. App'x 150 (Fed. Cir.), petition for hearing en bane denied, 592 F.3d 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. May 14, 2010) (No. 091395).
110
!d. at 151-52.
111
As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court vacated the Feperal Circuit's
judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the claim was precluded because
members of the plairitiff class might have been bound by Williams. Beer v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2865 (2011).
112
925 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 2010).
113
!d. at 904.
114
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25(a) ("The compensation of a ... judge or justice shall be
established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of office for which he or she
was elected or appointed.").
107
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115

· · dges economically.
Indeed, judicial pay remained frozen due to a political
JU
•
116
.
impasse over legislators' sall:).nes.
Although
there was ev1"dence th at. the fr. amers
of the Compensation Clause were concerned about the effects of mflatwn on
iudicial salaries, that evidence also suggested that the framers did not regard the
~ffects of inflation as representing "a per se violation of the Compensation
Clause." 117 Nevertheless, the political impasse between the governor and the
legislature meant that those of~cials ~ad "fail[ed] to consider judicial
compensation increases on the ments, and mstead [held] them hostage to other
118
legislative objectives." This in tum "threaten[ed] the structural independence of
119
the Judiciary," which violated fundamental notions of separation of powers.
Maron v. Silver did not explicitly hold that New York judges must receive
cost-of-living pay increases. Requiring the political branches to consider the issue
of judicial pay raises "on the merits" does not direct the governor and the
120
legislature to approve such raises. The court declined to direct any particular
substantive result, reasoning that the judiciary should rarely inject itself into
121
budgetary decisions. Issuing a direct order probably was not necessary, as the
parties accepted that the state judges "have earned and deserve a salary
increase." 122 Hence, addressing the question of judicial pay "on the merits" seems
inevitably to foreshadow some kind ofupward salary adjustment. 123
It is far from clear whether Maron v. Silver will provide support for the
federal judges in Beer or their counterparts elsewhere in the nation. For one thing,
the New York court thought that Hatter and other federal cases did not outlaw
indirect diminution of judicial salaries as a result of inflation. 124 Of course, no state
court can bind the Supreme Court on a matter of federal law, especially f~deral
constitutional law, but the court's conclusion is consistent .with the Federal
Circuit's position in both Williams and Beer. At the same time, some of the
reasoning in Maron v. Silver appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
view of the federal Compensation Clause. The New York court found no

115

Maron, 925 N.E.2d at 910.
Id at 904-05.
117
Id at 911.
118
Id at 914.
119
Id. at 915. The court declined to decide whether current salaries of Empire State
judges were too low, leaving that matter "in the first instance" to the legislature. Id at 916.
120
See id. at 914.
121
Id at 915.
122
!d. at 904.
123
The New York legislature responded to Maron v. Silver by authorizing a
116

commission to make quadrennial recommendations. about judicial compensation. Act .of
Dec. 10, 2010, 2010 N.Y. Consol. Laws Adv. Legis. Sei:-v. 567 (LexisNexis). Many judges
have expressed dissatisfaction with this arrangement because any pay· increase that the
commission might recommend would not take effect until 2012 at the earliest and in any
event would not be guaranteed. See William G1aberson, Angry Over Pay, State Judges
·
Want a Union-Like Group, a Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,2011, at A18.
124
Maron, 925 N.E.2d at 910.
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20

· impennissible diminution of judicial salaries in part because legislators, the
governor, and other constitutional officers also had not received pay raises. 125 In
Will, however, the Supreme Court found it irrelevant that other federal officials
suffered the same financial injury because those other officials did not enjoy the
explicit protection against salary diminution that the Compensation Clause accords
to Article III judges. 126
At the same time, the persistent failure to provide New York judges with costof-living increases over an eleven-year period appears to be a more compelling
case for finding an impennissible ·diminution in judicial compensation than the
erratic course of such increases for federal judges over the past two decades. Still,
the 2001 federal legislation requiring speci'fic congressional approval for
increasing judicial salaries might constitute the type of discrimination that could
run afoul of the federal Compensation Clause. 127 Even if Congress has no
constitutional obligation to award cost-of-living increases or set judicial salaries at
any particular level, the question of how much judges should be paid deserves
thoughtful consideration as a matter of policy. The next section offers an overview
of some of the factors that warrant attention in any policy discussion.
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V. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION AS A POLICY ISSUE

The failure to award federal judges cost-of-living increases in about one-third
of the years since passage of the Ethics Reform Act has generated widespread
criticism and concern. As noted earlier, Justice Breyer addressed the erosion of
judicial compensation both in Hatter and in his dissent from the denial of certiorari
in Williams. 128 Chief Justice Rehnquist regularly called attention to judicial
compensation in his annual state of the judiciary report; 129 Chief Justice Roberts
devoted his entire 2006 report to that subject 130 and has referred to it in almost all
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!d. at 912.
126
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 226 (1980); see supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
127
See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
128
See supra notes 85-86, 102 and accompanying text.
129
See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2000 YEAR-END REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1-3; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2003
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF
JUSTICE'S 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY .1. All of these year-end
reports, as well as those produced by Chief Justice Roberts, see infra notes 130-131, are
available on the public information page of the Supreme Court's website. Chief Justice's
Year-End Reports on the Federal Judicimy, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx (last visited Jan.
15, 2011).
130
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 1-8 [hereinafter 2006 REPORT]. This document contains an appendix
summarizing the federal courts' workload.
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other reports. 131 Moreover, commentators and bar associations have decried the
situation and called for higher judicial compensation to take account of inflation. 132
Chief Justice Roberts summarized the main points of concern in his 2006
report. Using 1969 as a baseline, he noted that in that year federal district judges
were paid "21% more than the dean at a top law school and 43% more than its
~enior law professors," whereas in 2006 federal district judges were making
.;,substantially less than-about half-what the deans and senior law professors at
133
top schools [were] paid."
Moreover, during the same period the average
American worker's real wages had risen by 17.8% while federal judges' salaries
134
had declined by 23.9%. While compensation was eroding, the composition of
the federal judiciary also has changed so its members "are no longer drawn
primarily from among the best lawyers in the practicing bar." 135 Almost two-thirds
of President Eisenhower's appointees to federal district courts came from the
private bar, while just over one-third came from the public sector. 136 Under
President George W. Bush, however, less than 40% of district judges came to the
bench from the private sector, while about 60% came from the public sector. 137 At
the same time, attrition has. increased, with larger numbers of judges leaving the
bench: thirty-eight judges have done so since 2000. 138
Other critics have pointed to institutional problems associated with judicial
attrition. For example, departing judges take with them experience and expertise
that are difficult to replace. 139 Early departures result in larger dockets for
remaining judges, at least until vacancies are filled, and the process for appointing
judges has become increasingly time-consuming and contentious. 140
These are legitimate concerns, but we should not uncritically accept the
diagnosis of impending doom. First, it is important to consider the baseline against
131
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JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CIDEF JUSTICE'S 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 7-8; JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2007 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6-8; JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2005 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3-5. Chief Justice Roberts's most recent report did
not address judicial compensation but did note budgetary constraints and judicial vacancies
as high-priority concerns. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2010 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5-8.
132
See, e.g., AM. BARAss'N & FED. BARASS'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY: AN UPDATE
ON THE URGENT NEED FOR ACTION (2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY]; Blake
Denton, The Federal Judicial Salary Crisis, 2 DREXEL L. REv. 152 (2009).
133
2006 REPORT, supra note 130, at 2.
134 !d. at 3.
135
!d. at 4.
136
!d. at 3-4.
137 !d.
\
138
!d. at 6. The American Bar Association noted that "more than 100 Article III
judge~ left the bench between 1990 and 2006, as did additional numbers ofbankruptcy and
magistrate judges." AM. BAR ASS'N, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NEED FOR
JUDICIAL PAY REFORM 2 (2007).
139 FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY, supra note 132, at 21.
140
See id. at 21-22.

42

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No.1

which we measure trends in the real value of judicial compensation. It is quite
common to use 1969 for this purpose, but that year might bias conclusions about
the effects of inflation. Federal judicial salaries increased substantially in 1969,
reaching their highest value in real terms since 1913. 141 The whole point of the
1969 pay raise was to inake up for stagnant salaries for officials in all tl1ree
142
branches of the federal government.
Using 1986 as a starting point might
suggest a different conclusion: in real terms, judicial salaries in 2006 were more
than 14% higher than they were two decades earlier. 143 This comparison suggests
that concerns about judicial compensation are exaggerated. It is also worth noting
that the real value of judicial salaries was lower in 1986 than it was in any year
since 195 5. 144 In other words, we should recognize that the choice of baseline can
affect the interpretation of trends in judicial compensation.
Second, it is also important to consider the baseline for assessing the
background of newly appointed federal judges. Chief Justice Roberts focused on
the Eisenhower administration, but that era might have been atypical. Eisenhower
appointed an unusually high percentage of his district judges directly from private
practice. 145 In recent years, more newly appointed federal district judges have had
previous experience on the bench, either as state judges or as federal magistrate or
bankmptcy judges. 146 It is possible that having a more "professional" federal
judiciary has benefits both for the judiciary and for the public. 147 It also is possible
that the disadvantages of such a system outweigh its benefits. What we can say,
however, is that those who deplore the reduction in the propmiion of private
141

KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34281, JUDICIAL SALARY:
CURRENT ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 19 (2008).
142
FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY, supra note 132, at 7.
143
See SCOTT, supra note 141, at 40-41 (containing a chart indicating a 14% increase
in real judicial salaries from $144,762 in 1986 to $165,200 in 2006).
144
!d. at 20.
145
Id. at 7-8 ("[T]he Eisenhower Administration appointed 65.1% of its federal
judges from private practice, while no other administration since 1933 has appointed more
than 55% of its federal judges from the same population.").
It is also possible that, entirely apart from compensation considerations, the greater
length and increasing contentiousness of the process for nominating and confirming federal
judges has made the prospect of judicial service less attractive for private practitioners. The
disruption affects any prospective judge, but is especially problematic for private
practitioners who face pressure to recruit and retain clients in ways that public-sector
lawyers do not. I am indebted to my fellow panelists at a November 2010 program on
judicial vacancies sponsored by the Federal Bar Association for emphasizing the reluctance
of potential nominees to put their personal and professional lives on hold for months if not
years. For data on the duration of the confirmation process for recently confirmed judges,
see RUSSELL WHEELER, BROOKINGS INST., JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS IN THE FIRST
FOURTEEN MONTHS OF THE 0BAMA AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS (2010).
146
See Russell Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of US. District Judges: Likely
Causes and Possible Implications, 93 JUDICATURE 140, 140-41 (2010).
147
See id. at 142 (summarizing arguments in favor of a professionalized judiciaty).
But see id. at 143 (summarizing arguments critical of a professionalized judiciary).
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practitioners on the bench have not offered a systematic argument in support of
. .
148
their positiOn.
·
Third, advocates for increasing judicial compensation point to the number of
judges who resign for financial reasons. Much of the evidence adduced in support
149
Even one analyst who found a statistically
.of this concern is anecdotal.
significant relation~h~p ben:een _com~ens~tion and resi~ation concedes t~a~ "[t]he
total number of judicial resignatwns IS qmte low, even m recent years, so It rs hard
150
to speak of a 'crisis' of resignations. " Another analyst noted tl:at "[j]udges have
complained about the low salary of the office from the earliest years of the
Republic" 151 and found that, over the two centuries she studied, "judges who resign
to take other employment, for whatever reason, still represent less than 5% of the
judiciary." 152 In other words, we should be concerned about the possibility that low
salaries might lead some judges to leave the bench, but we also should not
exaggerate the frequency with which this happens or assume that it is a strictly
modern phenomenon.
Fourth, we should recognize that the Compensation Clause might actually
hold down judicial salaries by forbidding decreases in judicial pay. As noted at the
outset, this ban on salaiy reduction plays an important role in protecting judicial
independence. 153 Nevertheless, this "one-way compensation ratchet" 154 could very
well make Congress reluctant to raise judicial salaries too readily because the
Constitution prohibits downward adjustments if subsequent events put a strain on
the federal budget. 155 Perhaps we should not expect judges and prospective judges
to recognize this counterintuitive idea, but it at least suggests that while money
might be important, it is not all that matters. This leads to one final point.
Although judges should be paid fairly, we should not forget that judicial
service offers more than financial rewards. If, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested at
his confirmation hearing, the role of a judge is analogous to that of a baseball
umpire, 156 the ability to decide rather than simply to argue must represent a
148

See id. at 142---43.
See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY, supra note 132, at 14-15.
150
Scott Duke Kominers, Salary Erosion and Federal Judicial Resignation 13 (Oct.
28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l114432.
151
Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal
Judicial Service-and Disservice-1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 356 (1993).
152
Id. at 364.
153
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
154
Williams v. "United States, 535 U.S. 911 ,. 914 (2002) (Breye(, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
155
See Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REv. 953,
985 (2005).
156
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't
make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make
sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game
to see the umpire.").
149
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significant attraction. Recall the story about the umpire who, when asked whether a
pitch was a ball or a shi.ke, replies: "It ain't nothing 'til I say so." 157 Those who
believe that the courts are facing a crisis of retention and recruihnent due to
inadequate judicial salaries typically do not suggest what level of compensation
they regard as appropriate or necessary to remedy the problem. Beyond that, we
ought to be deeply skeptical about anyone who seeks a judicial position primarily
for the salary. Charles Evans Hughes wisely observed that "we should be cautious
about increasing the chance of drawing [people] to the public service who seek it
for the sake of the compensation, " 158 and added that, "to attract good [people] and
to secure efficiency, the honour and independence of the office are of far greater
account than the emoluments that attach to it. " 159
VI. CONCLUSION

Protecting judges against salary diminution is an important device to ensure
their independence. The basic principle that judicial salaries may not be reduced
seems well established, and the prospect of punitive or discriminatory taxes
directed at the judiciary appears remote to say the least. The most challenging issue
relating to judicial compensation concerns cost-of-living increases. Under existing
doctrine, it is not clear that the simple failure to approve such increases violates the
Compensation Clause because those increases might not have vested until the day
that they actually would take effect. On the other hand, the statutory change which
requires explicit congressional approval for judicial pay raises does pose
troublesome constitutional questions. Under this arrangement, only judges must
obtain legislative authorization for cost-of-living adjustments, while the Ethics
Reform Act provides that all other covered officials receive such adjushnents
automatically unless Congress passes blocking legislation. This differential
treatment might well rise to the level of discrimination against the judiciary that
the Supreme Court has found to contravene the Compensation Clause.
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Judge Dee Benson of the United States District Court for the District of Utah
related this anecdote in his keynote address to the conference for which this paper was
prepared. In Judge Benson's version, the batter was Ted Williams and the catcher was Yogi
Berra, both American League stars; the umpire was not identified. I have heard the same
story told about the legendary National League umpire Bill Klem (in that version, neither
the batter nor the catcher was named). Of course, the specific participants in this episode
are not the point of the story.
158

CHARLES .EVANS
GOVERNMENT 49 (1910).
159

/d. at 50.
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